Importance: Understanding the causes and patient impacts of surgical adverse events will help improve systems and operational practices to avoid incidents in the future.
Introduction
The use of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery has exponentially increased during the last decade. Between 2007 and 2013, over 1.74 million robotic procedures were performed in the U.S., of which over 1.5 million (86%) were performed in gynecology and urology, while the number of procedures in other surgical specialties altogether was less than 250,000 (14%) 1 . Several previous studies on the outcomes and rates of complications during robotic procedures in the areas of gynecology, urology, and general surgery have been done. Yet no comprehensive study of the safety and reliability of surgical robots has been performed.
Our study focuses on analysis of all the adverse events related to robotic surgical systems, collected by the FDA MAUDE database 2 during the 14-year period of 2000-2013. It covers the events experienced during the robotic procedures in six major surgical specialties: gynecology, urology, general, colorectal, cardiothoracic, and head and neck surgery. We analyzed the safety-related incidents, including deaths, injuries, and device malfunctions, to understand their causes and measure their impact on patients and on the progress of the surgery.
There have been several reports by different surgical institutions on occasional software-related, mechanical, and electrical failures of system components and instruments during robotic procedures [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . A few studies analyzed the FDA MAUDE reports related to robotic surgical systems [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] (see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix). However, most of the previous work targeted only two common robotic surgical specialties of gynecology and urology, or only analyzed small subsets or specific types of device failure modes (e.g.,
electro-cautery failures, electrosurgical injuries, instrument failures).
An important question is whether the evolution of the robotic systems with new technologies and features over the years has improved the safety of robotic systems and their effectiveness across different surgical specialties. Our goal is to use the knowledge gained from this analysis to provide insights on design of future surgical systems that by taking advantage of advanced safety mechanisms, improved human Copyright © 2015: Authors.
machine interfaces, and regulated operational practices can minimize the adverse impact on both the patients and surgical teams.
Methods

Data Sources
The Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience ("MAUDE") database is a publicly available collection of suspected medical device-related adverse event reports, submitted by mandatory (user facilities, manufacturers, and distributors) and voluntary (health care professionals, patients, and customers) reporters to the FDA 2 . Manufacturers and the FDA regularly monitor these reports to detect and correct device-related safety issues in a timely manner. Each adverse event report contains information such as Device Name; Manufacturer Name; Event Type ("Malfunction," "Injury," "Death," or "Other"); Event Date; Report Date; and human-written Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields, which provide a short description of the incident, as well as any comments made or follow-up actions taken by the manufacturer to detect and address device problems 2 .
While the MAUDE database, as a spontaneous reporting system, suffers from underreporting and inconsistencies 24, 25, 26 , it provides valuable insights on real incidents that occurred during the robotic procedures and impacted patient safety. We treated the reported data on deaths, injuries, and device malfunctions provided by the MAUDE as a sample set to estimate the lower bounds on prevalence of adverse events and identify examples of their major causes and patient impacts (see eMethods for more details).
Data Analysis Methods
We extracted all the reports related to the systems and instruments used in robotic surgery by searching for related keywords in the Device Name and Manufacturer Name fields of the MAUDE records posted between January 2000 and December 2013. In addition to the structured information that was directly Copyright © 2015: Authors.
available from the reports, we extracted further information from the unstructured human-written descriptions of events by natural language parsing of the Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields. We did so by creating several domain-specific dictionaries (e.g., for patient complications, surgery types, surgical instruments, and malfunction types) and pattern-matching rules as well as parts-of-speech (POS) and negation taggers to interpret the semantics of the event descriptions (Figure 1 in Appendix).
The results generated by the automated analysis tools were manually reviewed for accuracy and validity.
We extracted the following information:
• Patient injury (such as burns, cuts, or damage to organs) and death events that were reported under another Event Type, such as "Malfunction" or "Other".
• Surgical specialty and type of robotic procedure during which the adverse events occurred.
• Major types of device or instrument malfunctions (e.g., falling of burnt/broken pieces of instruments into patients' bodies or electrical arcing of instruments)
• Adverse events that caused an interruption in the progress of surgery, by leading the surgical team to troubleshoot technical problems (e.g., restarting the system), convert the procedure to nonrobotic surgical approaches (such as laparoscopy or open surgery), or abort the procedure and reschedule it to a later time.
We compared the number of adverse events (in general) and injury/death events and procedure conversions (in particular) per 100,000 procedures across different surgical specialties. The rate of events was estimated by dividing the number of adverse events that occurred in each year (based on the Event Date) by the annual number of robotic procedures performed in the U.S. The total number of procedures
Figure 1. Annual Numbers of Adverse Event Reports and Rates of Events per Procedure
The left Y-axis corresponds to the bars showing the absolute numbers of adverse events (based on the year that reports were received by the FDA Adverse Events across Different Surgical Specialties: Table 1 shows the numbers of adverse events reported in different surgical specialties and their impact on patients (injuries or deaths) and progress of surgery (procedure conversion or rescheduling). The last row shows examples of the most common types of procedures reported in each specialty.
• The majority of reports were related to gynecology (30.1%), urology (14.7%), and cardiothoracic (3.7%) surgeries, such as hysterectomy (2,331), prostatectomy (1,291), and thoracic (110) procedures, respectively.
• Cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries involved a higher number of deaths per adverse event report (6.4% and 19.7%) than gynecology and urology (1.4 and 1.9%).
• The highest number of procedure conversions per adverse event was for cardiothoracic (16.8%) and urology (13.5%), and the highest rates of procedure rescheduling were for urology (9.5%), general (3.0%), and cardiothoracic (2.8%) surgeries.
Copyright © 2015: Authors. a Percentages are over all the adverse event reports (n = 10,624). b Percentages are over the total adverse events reported for a surgical specialty.
The higher percentage of adverse events reported in gynecology and urology could be due to the higher number of these procedures performed.
Of all the reports, only 5,721 (53.8%) indicated the class and type of surgery involved. However, the majority of reports with missing information on the type of surgery were related to device malfunctions and "Other" events (97.6%). In order to compare the rate of adverse events across different specialties, we focused only on reports related to injuries, deaths, and procedure conversions. For the majority of these events (92.2% of injury reports, 95.1% of deaths, and 72.2% of procedure conversions), the surgery type information was available and the rest (with 'N/A' surgical specialty) were removed from our analysis. In order to estimate the rate of events per procedure, we regrouped the events into four major categories of "Gynecology," "Urology," "General," and "Cardiothoracic and Head and Neck," according to the manufacturer's reports 1, 27 . The "General" category includes both colorectal and general specialties.
As shown in (12) in the cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery.
Device and Instrument Malfunctions:
We identified five major categories of device and instrument malfunctions experienced during procedures that impacted the patients, either by causing injuries and complications or by interrupting the progress of surgery and/or prolonging procedure times. Table 2 shows the numbers of events in each category, the event types as indicated by reporters, and the actions taken by the surgical team to resolve the problems. The Other category includes the malfunctions that could not be classified in any of the classes.
• System errors and video/imaging problems contributed to 787 (7.4%) of the adverse events and were the major contributors to the system resets (274 cases, 82% of all system resets), conversion of the procedures to a non-robotic approach (462 cases, 59.2% of all conversions), and aborting/rescheduling of the procedures (221 cases, 81.8% of all cases).
• Falling of the broken/burnt pieces into the patient's body constituted about 1,557 (14.7%) of the adverse events. In almost all these cases, the procedure was interrupted, and the surgical team spent some time searching for the missing pieces and retrieving them from the patient (in 119 cases, a patient injury, and in one case a death, was reported).
• Electrical arcing, sparking, or charring of instruments and burns or holes developed in the tip cover accessories constituted 1,111 reports (10.5% of the events), leading to nearly 193 injuries, such as burning of tissues.
• Unintended operation of instruments, such as uncontrolled movements and spontaneous powering on/off, happened in 1,078 of the adverse events (10.1%), including 52 injuries and 2 deaths.
In total, 5,054 reports (47.6%) were related to breakage of different parts of the system and instruments.
Cable, wire, or tube breakages are example causes of imaging problems at the surgeon's console or unintended instrument operations.
Copyright © 2015: Authors. Table 3 in Appendix lists the descriptions and frequencies of the most common system error codes extracted from the reports. In total, 9,382 reports were about technical problems, including 1,104 cases (10.4% of all the adverse events) in which the procedure was interrupted and additional time was spent on troubleshooting the errors, resetting the system, and/or converting the procedure to a traditional technique, or rescheduling the procedure to a later time.
Figure 2. Cumulative rates of malfunctions per procedure
The rates of malfunctions per procedure were obtained for each week (see Figure 2 in Appendix for more details).
Injury and Death Causes:
A manual review of a sample set of injury and death reports (from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] was conducted. This allowed us to classify the causes indicated by reporters into three main categories:
inherent risks associated with surgery, technical issues with the robot, and mistakes made by the surgical team. For the majority of death events, little or no information was provided in the reports. About 33.7%
of the death events were related to inherent risks or complications during surgery, and 7% were attributed to operator mistakes. About 62% of the injury events involved device malfunctions (see Table 2 ), and the rest were related to operator errors (7.1%), improper positioning of patient or port incisions (6.3%), inherent risks of surgery (3.9%), or problems with grounding the equipment (1.5%) (see Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix).
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Discussion
Our analysis shows an increasing number of adverse events related to the robotic surgical systems being reported. As cautioned by the FDA 2,31 , the number of MAUDE reports may not be used to evaluate the changes in rates of events over time, because the increased reporting of events may be due to different factors, e.g., the increasing use of surgical systems 1 , changes in the manufacturers' reporting practices 30 , and/or better awareness and increased publicity resulting from product recalls, media coverage, and litigation 31 . Therefore, we measured the prevalence of adverse events by estimating the number of events reported per procedure. We found that despite a relatively high number of reports, the vast majority of procedures were successful and did not involve any problems and the number of injury/death events per procedure have stayed constant since 2007.
However, our analysis shows that estimated number of events per procedure in complex surgical areas, such as cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery were significantly higher than gynecology, urology, and general surgeries. Although not all the reported injuries and deaths were due to device problems, and the procedure conversions, of themselves, cannot be considered adverse events 41, 42 , the estimated numbers of injury/death events and conversions per procedure are used as a metric to measure the difficulty experienced in different surgical specialties. The best that we can tell from the available data is that the higher number of injury, death, and conversion per adverse event, in cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries, could be indirectly explained by the higher complexity of the procedures, less frequent use of robotic devices, and less robotic expertise in these fields. Although the use of robotic technology has rapidly grown in urology and gynecology for prostatectomy and hysterectomy, it has been slow to percolate into more complex areas, such as cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery. 46 .
In practice, the use of the robotic platform involves the interface of a sophisticated machine (see Table 6 in Appendix) with surgical teams, in an area of patient care that is safety-critical. From a technology perspective, some of the reported events could be prevented by employing substantially improved safety practices and controls in the design and operation of surgical systems. Some examples include:
• New safety engines for monitoring of procedures (including surgeon, patient, and device status) and providing comprehensive feedback to surgical team on upcoming events and troubleshooting procedures to prevent long procedure interruptions.
• Providing real-time feedback to the surgeon on the safe surgical paths that can be taken 47 , by computing 3D models of the organs under surgery and surrounding critical tissues and vessels, as well as surgeon-specific modeling and monitoring of robotic surgical motions 48 , to minimize the risk of approaching dangerous limits and inadvertent patient injuries.
• Improved human-machine interfaces and surgical simulators that train surgical teams for handling technical problems and assess their actions in real-time during the surgery.
Limitations
The results of our study come with the caveats that inherent risks exist in all surgical procedures (more so in complex procedures) and that the MAUDE database suffers from underreporting and inconsistencies.
Thus, the estimated number of adverse events per procedure are likely to be lower than the actual numbers in robotic surgery. Further, the lack of detailed information in the reports makes it difficult to determine the exact causes and circumstances underlying the events. Therefore, the sensitivity of adverse event trends to changes in reporting mechanisms, surgical team expertise, and inherent risks of surgery could not be assessed here.
Conclusions
While the robotic surgical systems have been successfully adopted in many different specialties, this study demonstrates several important findings: (1) the overall numbers of injury and death events per procedure have stayed relatively constant over the years, (2) the probability of events in complex surgical specialties of cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery has been higher than other specialties, (3) device and instrument malfunctions have affected thousands of patients and surgical teams by causing complications and prolonged procedure times.
As the surgical systems continue to evolve with new technologies, uniform standards for surgical team training, advanced human machine interfaces, improved accident investigation and reporting mechanisms, and safety-based design techniques should be developed to reduce incident rates in the future. 
Appendix Underreporting
The underreporting in data collection is a fairly common problem in social sciences, public health, criminology, and microeconomics. It occurs when the counting of some event of interest is for some reason incomplete or there are errors in recording the outcomes. Examples are unemployment data, infectious or chronic disease data (e.g. HIV or diabetes), crimes with an aspect of shame (e.g. sexuality and domestic violence), error counts in a production processes or software engineering, and traffic accidents with minor damage [1] . An estimated prevalence of events based on the incomplete counts is likely to be smaller than the true proportion of events in the population. Several inference techniques based on binomial, beta-binomial, and regression models have been proposed for estimating the actual count values [2] . However, in all those techniques the reporting probability (underreporting rate) is assumed to be a constant parameter over time that is estimated based on the sample counts.
A very similar problem exists in preliminary or pilot clinical investigations, epidemiological surveys, and longitude studies where the objective is to estimate any possible clinical effect of a treatment or prevalence of a particular disease in a population of patients, but the prevalence of events can only be estimated by selecting a sample of patients from the population [3] .
In all these situations, the prevalence of the events are estimated based on a random sample of events from the population, under the assumption that the sample set contains the same characteristics and distributions of the actual population, including those of the underreported and missing cases.
Furthermore, it is often required to perform a sample-size calculation based on confidence intervals in order to provide a precise estimate with a large margin of certainty and to make sure that the estimated proportion is close to the actual proportion with a high probability [3] . Confidence intervals for the proportions estimated based on samples from large populations and finite populations can be calculated by using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution as follows:
For large populations:
For finite populations:
where N is the size of sample, = ! ! is the estimate of the proportion of events of interests in the sample and !"#$%&'(") is the size of population in case of finite populations [3] .
In this study, we estimated the prevalence of adverse events by making sure that we have a significantly large enough number of samples to provide confident estimates. Our estimations are obtained under the assumption that the characteristics and distributions of the observed events are not significantly different from those in the actual population and would not significantly change after including the underreported cases. We are currently investigating the extension of the proposed inference techniques in [1] [2] to estimate the actual number of adverse events with considering a variable reporting probability over time. 27 . Whenever the estimated numbers from two different sources did not match or the data were available only for the total worldwide procedures, we chose the maximum number of procedures for that year in order to achieve a lower bound on the likelihood of events.
We estimated the number of procedures per week from annual number of procedures by fitting a 4-degree polynomial curve (R (14), Optical system (14), Masters (4), Power supply/circuit (6), Unknown error (3) Laparoscopic (2) Open (8) They found that 43.5% of the events were related to the use of energy instruments, that 30.97% were associated with the surgical systems and instruments, and that the severity of events correlated with the type of surgery and the type of device used.
Finally, Manoucheri et al. 23 evaluated the adverse events reported during robotic gynecologic procedures and found that the majority of reported injuries (65%) were not directly related to the surgical system; 21% were related to operator error; and 14% were due to technical system failures.
Copyright © 2015: Authors. 
#20008
The angular position of one or more robotic joint's on the specified manipulator, as measured by the joint's primary control sensor (encoder) and the secondary sensor (potentiometer), were out of specified tolerance for agreement. Table 5 lists some example reports on device malfunctions that impacted patients during cardiothoracic procedures. Converted to open surgery. Table 6 . Example complex robotic interactions with possible failure modes 1) A surgeon or surgical assistant needs to be by the patient's side, inserting the ports/scope/instruments.
2) The main surgeon sits at a console some distance away from the patient, with no peripheral vision, and so does not get to see the manipulation of the arms in and around the patient.
3) Any change of instrumentation requires a pause in proceedings, as the patient-side surgeon stops and changes instruments. Once the instrument is docked in the port, registered, and secured, the procedure can be resumed. from where it was stopped. Each of those instrument changes takes about 30 seconds to 2 minutes, so if there are 10 instrument changes in a case, that add 20 minutes to the total time of the procedure. 4) There is no tactile feedback or haptics. Several of the adverse events included inadvertent injury to the aorta, right ventricle, lungs, etc. Sometimes, vessels have been ripped because of lack of feel, and the force delivered by the grasping forceps might significantly exceed safe limits.
5) The endoscope's field of vision is very limited and it can be easy to get disoriented, in terms of both the horizon and the location within the body. 6 ) Visualization requires insufflation of carbon dioxide at a high flow of 6-10 liters/minute. While CO 2 insufflation is also done in non-robotic laparoscopy, it is usually not at such a high flow. That high flow of CO 2 can result in absorption of carbon dioxide, which can cause significant metabolic derangements that affect the heart. 7) Each instrument may be used only 10 times, after which software shutdown occurs, driving up the costs and making instruments part of the disposable costs. In open and non-robotic laparoscopic surgeries, some disposable instruments are used, but they are not as expensive as robotic instruments. 8) There is an obligatory setup time, in addition to longer operative times with the robot. Robotic procedures in all fields of surgery take longer than non-robotic (open or laparoscopic) procedures.
